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Essay 
The Chevronization of Auer 
Kristin E. Hickman† & Mark R. Thomson†† 
Kisor v. Wilkie is pending before the Supreme Court as part 
of OT 2018.1 The sole question in Kisor is whether the Court 
should jettison the deferential standard of judicial review known 
as Auer deference, which directs courts to defer to an agency’s 
interpretation of its own regulation unless the interpretation is 
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.2 The 
Court’s decision to hear argument in Kisor makes this an oppor-
tune time to reassess Auer ’s rationales. 
When it first announced the Auer standard—in Bowles v. 
Seminole Rock & Sand Co.—the Supreme Court did not provide 
much explanation or justification for it.3 Auer ’s supporters sub-
sequently identified several. Broadly speaking, the rationales for 
Auer can be grouped into two categories: doctrinal and practical. 
The overwhelming majority of scholarship and opinion re-
garding Auer deference focuses on its doctrinal underpinnings—
i.e., whether Auer is sound as a matter of legal theory.4 It is em-
phatically not this essay’s purpose to join that debate. Instead, 
 
†  Distinguished McKnight University Professor & Harlan Albert Rogers 
Professor in Law, University of Minnesota Law School. Copyright © 2019 by 
Kristin E. Hickman. 
††  Associate Attorney, Crowell & Moring LLP. The authors thank Nick 
Bednar and Aaron Nielson for helpful comments. Copyright © 2019 by Mark R. 
Thomson. 
 1. Order Granting Certiorari, Kisor v. Wilkie, No. 18-15, 139 S. Ct. 657, 
2018 WL 6439837 (Dec. 10, 2018) (Mem.). 
 2. See id.; see also Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). 
 3. See Auer, 519 U.S. at 461 (granting deference based on “our jurispru-
dence,” but without explaining the reasons underlying that jurisprudence); 
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945) (declaring, with-
out explanation or citation, that “the ultimate criterion [in construing an am-
biguous regulation] is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of con-
trolling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation.”). 
 4. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vemeule, The Unbearable Right-
ness of Auer, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 297 (2017); Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri 
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this essay focuses on the practical rationales for Auer, which 
have received much less scholarly attention. 
What are those practical rationales? Although he ultimately 
called for the Court to repudiate the Auer standard,5 Justice An-
tonin Scalia neatly summarized them: 
[Auer deference] makes the job of a reviewing court much easier, and 
since it usually produces affirmance of the agency’s view without con-
flict in the Circuits, it imparts (once the agency has spoken to clarify 
the regulation) certainty and predictability to the administrative pro-
cess.6 
Auer ’s defenders often echo those points, contending that 
Auer (1) simplifies the judicial task,7 (2) ensures that courts 
across the country give the same meaning to ambiguous regula-
tions,8 and (3) allows regulated parties to more accurately fore-
cast how courts will construe ambiguous regulations.9 
These practical rationales have some outward appeal. Pin-
ning down the precise meaning of a particular word or phrase 
can be tedious and difficult, for instance when the word or phrase 
is highly technical in scope or depends for its meaning on other 
parts of a convoluted regulatory scheme. When multiple courts 
undertake to interpret the same ambiguous regulatory lan-
guage, the result is often multiple interpretations of that lan-
guage, so that the regulation ends up meaning different things 
in different jurisdictions. Uncertainty about how a particular 
regulation applies can, in turn, make it difficult for regulated 
parties to conform their actions to the law. Auer promises to 
solve those problems with a simple and straightforward com-
mand: when the answer isn’t obvious, the agency’s interpreta-
tion controls. 
 
Pogoriler, Seminole Rock’s Domain, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1449 (2011); John 
F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Inter-
pretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612 (1996). 
 5. Decker v. Northwest Envt’l Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 616–21 (2013) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 6. Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 69 (2011) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
 7. See, e.g., Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 4, at 298. 
 8. See, e.g., Matthew Mezger, Using Interpretive Methodology to Get Out 
From Seminole Rock and a Hard Place, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1335, 1358–59 
(2016); Ben Snowden, Has Auer’s Hour Arrived?, 28 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 
31, 34 (2014). 
 9. See, e.g., Cynthia Barmore, Auer in Action: Deference After Talk Amer-
ica, 76 OHIO ST. L. J. 813, 816–17 (2015). 
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The practical argument for Auer deference only holds up, 
however, to the extent Auer actually is simple and straightfor-
ward to apply. As the Auer standard becomes more difficult to 
apply, the practical rationales that support it become less com-
pelling. 
This problem is not merely theoretical. For several years, 
courts have been carving qualifications and exceptions into Auer 
that have transformed a seemingly simple legal standard into a 
doctrine of uncertain scope and application. A list of those excep-
tions, and questions they raise, might include the following: 
 Auer deference does not apply where a regulation is clear.10 
But what qualifies a regulation as unclear? And what inter-
pretive tools should courts apply before concluding that a 
regulation is unclear? 
 Auer deference is unwarranted when an agency’s interpre-
tation “does not reflect the agency’s fair and considered 
judgment on the matter in question,” as when the interpre-
tation conflicts with a prior one, or when it appears to be 
nothing more than a “convenient litigating position,” or a 
“post hoc rationalization advanced by an agency seeking to 
defend past agency action against attack.”11 Courts have 
disagreed about how to apply each of those exceptions.12 
 Some courts have held that some types of nonbinding 
agency pronouncements are not due Auer deference, not-
withstanding that those same courts routinely defer to 
other nonbinding agency pronouncements.13 The basis for 
this disparate treatment is murky at best. 
 
 10. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000). 
 11. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155 (2012). 
 12. See, e.g., Ohio Dept’ of Medicaid v. Price, 864 F.3d 469 (6th Cir. 2017) 
(Clay, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for deferring to an interpretation that 
was “nothing more than a convenient litigating position”) (quotation marks 
omitted); Bible v. United Student Aid Funds, 799 F.3d 633, 674 (7th Cir. 2015) 
(Manion, J., dissenting in part) (criticizing majority for deferring to an interpre-
tation that was “entirely new and inconsistent with [the agency’s] prior inter-
pretations”); Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC v. 1.01 Acres, More or Less in 
Penn Twp., 768 F.3d 300, 316–17 (3d Cir. 2014) (Jordan, J., dissenting) (criti-
cizing majority for deferring to agency’s newly-announced interpretation that 
was adopted “in reaction to the District Court’s decision in this case”). 
 13. See, e.g., Aqua Prods., Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 
2017) (en banc) (declining to give Auer deference to an interpretation by the 
Patent and Trademark Office because the interpretation was announced in an 
“interpretive nonbinding discussion” that was later re-designated as a “repre-
sentative non-binding discussion”); Lezama-Garcia v. Holder, 666 F.3d 518, 532 
(9th Cir. 2011) (declining to defer to an interpretation announced in a single-
member, nonprecedential decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals). 
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 Auer deference does not apply to interpretations of regula-
tions that give rise to penalties.14 The origin of this excep-
tion lies in due process and the notion that a party should 
have adequate notice that its actions violate agency regula-
tions before being subject to civil penalties.15 The distinction 
between penalties and mere adverse results is not always 
clear.16 
 Relatedly, an interpretation is not due Auer deference if it 
would result in “unfair surprise” to regulated parties.17 
What constitutes a surprise, and what differentiates a fair 
surprise from an unfair one, is anyone’s guess. 
 Auer deference does not apply to interpretations of regula-
tions that merely paraphrase or “parrot” statutory lan-
guage.18 How much daylight must there be between a regu-
lation and the statute for deference to apply? 
 In at least some instances, when Auer does not apply, the 
multi-factor Skidmore standard replaces it.19 But when 
must a court move on to analyze an agency’s interpretation 
of a regulation using Skidmore, as opposed to merely inval-
idating the interpretation de novo, for example as contrary 
to the regulation? 
 
 14. Christopher, 567 U.S. at 154; see also KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & RICHARD 
J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.8.2 (6th ed. 2018) (observing 
that courts have been less inclined to defer to agency interpretations of ambig-
uous regulations when doing so would subject parties to civil penalties without 
prior notice that their conduct was unlawful). 
 15. HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 14, at § 3.8.2 (recognizing this line of 
cases). 
 16. See, e.g., United States v. Chrysler Corp., 158 F.3d 1350 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
(analogizing a product recall order to the imposition of penalties for this pur-
pose); Upton v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 75 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(declining to defer in license suspension case); see also HICKMAN & PIERCE, su-
pra note 14, at § 3.8.2 (“[C]ourts in some cases have applied this approach even 
when the ‘penalty’ takes the form of particularly onerous consequences, rather 
than a fine or more traditional form of punishment.”). 
 17. Christopher, 567 U.S. at 154. 
 18. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 256–57 (2006); Hanah Metchis Vo-
lokh, The Anti-Parroting Canon, 6 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 290 (2011) (evaluat-
ing this Auer exception). 
 19. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (calling upon 
courts to give “weight” to an agency’s interpretation of a statute “depend[ing] 
upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, 
its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors 
which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control”); Christopher, 567 
U.S. at 159 (applying Skidmore in a case involving unfair surprise); Gonzales, 
546 U.S. at 268–69 (applying Skidmore to an interpretation of a parroting reg-
ulation). 
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This list of Auer exceptions and issues is non-exhaustive, and it 
seems likely that courts will identify new exceptions to Auer go-
ing forward. A multi-step Auer doctrine is emerging,20 one that 
mirrors the several steps and complexity of Auer deference’s 
close cousin, Chevron deference.21 Indeed, using phraseology ee-
rily reminiscent of Chevron’s two steps, the Solicitor General’s 
brief in the Kisor case suggests that “[c]ourts should apply [Auer] 
deference only after exhausting all the traditional tools of inter-
pretation and determining that the agency has reasonably inter-
preted any genuine ambiguity,” and even then “only if the 
agency’s interpretation represents its fair, considered, and con-
sistent judgment.”22 With each new exception or qualification, 
the Auer standard becomes harder to apply and less certain in 
its application—two criticisms long leveled at Chevron defer-
ence. 
Like Auer, Chevron started simply: Courts should defer to 
agencies’ reasonable interpretations of ambiguities in the stat-
utes those agencies are tasked with administering.23 For dec-
ades, however, courts have been piling caveats and qualifica-
tions atop Chevron’s basic premise. Courts and commentators 
have argued extensively over exactly how ambiguous a statute 
needs to be before deference becomes appropriate,24 and which 
 
 20. See, e.g., Marsh v. J. Alexander’s LLC, 905 F.3d 610, 624 n.12 (9th Cir. 
2018) (en banc) (describing “Auer’s two-step analysis”); see also HICKMAN & 
PIERCE, supra note 14, at § 3.8.3 (describing how Auer “may be developing its 
own Step Zero, Step One, and Step Two to resemble the steps of Mead and Chev-
ron”). 
 21. The Chevron doctrine derives from Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), which instructed reviewing 
courts evaluating agency interpretations of statutes to consider first whether 
the meaning of the relevant statute is clear, and if it’s not, then whether the 
agency’s resolution of the statutory ambiguity is reasonable. Id. at 842–43. For 
just one of many, many scholarly discussions of Chevron’s complexity, see Nich-
olas R. Bednar & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Inevitability, 85 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1392, 1418–41 (2017) (surveying Chevron’s many questions and result-
ing variations). 
 22. See Brief for Respondent at 28, 30, Kisor v. Wilkie, —- S. Ct. —- (No. 
18-15), 2019 WL 929000, at *28, *30 (Feb. 25, 2019). 
 23. See Meredith v. Time Ins. Co., 980 F.2d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 1993) (“Chev-
ron purported to establish a simple and predictable method . . . .”). 
 24. See, e.g., Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 573 U.S. 41 (2014) (featuring 
concurring and dissenting opinions criticizing Justice Kagan’s plurality opinion 
for rushing to find a statute ambiguous without making more of an effort to 
discern statutory meaning); Coyomani-Cielo v. Holder, 758 F.3d 908, 913 (7th 
Cir. 2014) (suggesting “a distinction between ‘clear’ meaning and a ‘better’ read-
ing” in Chevron analysis); Bednar & Hickman, supra note 21, at 1419–27 (ex-
ploring the question and citing cases). 
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tools of statutory interpretation ought to be considered in evalu-
ating statutory clarity.25 And they have disagreed over whether 
certain categories of cases should fall outside of Chevron’s reach, 
and what those categories might be.26 
The Supreme Court has led the way. In Christensen v. Har-
ris County, the Court announced that only certain types of 
agency pronouncements qualify for Chevron deference.27 In 
United States v. Mead Corp.,28 the Court introduced “Chevron 
Step Zero,” holding that Chevron deference is only appropriate 
“when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the 
agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and 
that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promul-
gated in the exercise of that authority,”29 but equivocated about 
exactly how to identify those conditions.30 In Barnhart v. Walton, 
the Court further obscured Chevron’s scope by suggesting that 
certain informal agency pronouncements might be due Chevron 
deference depending on “the interstitial nature of the legal ques-
tion, the related expertise of the Agency, the importance of the 
question to the administration of the statute, the complexity of 
that administration, and the careful consideration the Agency 
has given the question over a long period of time.”31 Just a few 
terms ago, in King v. Burwell, the Court applied a separate “ex-
traordinary cases” or “major questions” limitation on Chevron’s 
scope, whereby deference is not due to agencies’ interpretations 
of statutory provisions that carry special economic or political 
significance.32 
 
 25. See, e.g., Robert A. Katzmann, Judging Statutes 47 (2014); Brett M. Ka-
vanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2153–54 
(2016); Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 
72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351 (1994); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administra-
tive Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511. 
 26. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 
GEO. L.J. 833, 848–52 (2001) (recognizing fourteen different disagreements 
about Chevron’s scope that emerged in the doctrine’s first fifteen years). 
 27. 529 U.S. 576 (2000). 
 28. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 29. Id. at 226–27; see Merrill & Hickman, supra note 26, at 873 (coining the 
“Step Zero” term). 
 30. Mead, 533 U.S. at 229–31 (identifying “express congressional authori-
zations to engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication” as “a very good 
indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment,” but noting that “the want 
of that procedure . . . does not decide the case, for we have sometimes found 
reasons for Chevron deference even when no such administrative formality was 
required and none was afforded”). 
 31. 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002). 
 32. See 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015). 
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Circuit courts have added their own wrinkles. In the D.C. 
Circuit, for example, there is now a “Chevron Step One-and-a-
Half,” requiring courts to withhold Chevron deference unless the 
interpreting agency recognized that the statutory provision at 
issue is susceptible of multiple interpretations.33 The Fourth Cir-
cuit has suggested that deference is not warranted when the in-
terpretation at issue “is not based on [the agency’s] expertise in 
the particular field.”34 Some circuits have embraced the notion 
that an agency might be able to waive Chevron deference, even 
though standards of review normally are for courts rather than 
litigants to determine.35 And the list goes on. Justice Scalia com-
plained in 2012 about “the ugly and improbable structure that 
our law of administrative review has become,”36 and the com-
plexity has only grown since then. 
Indeed, Justice Scalia (among others) frequently bemoaned 
the many exceptions and caveats that the Court had built into 
Chevron precisely because they made Chevron hard to apply and 
robbed it of much of its practical value—not just in terms of sim-
plifying the judicial task, but also in terms of providing easy-to-
understand guidance for regulated parties.37 Even justices and 
scholars who have advocated for the aforementioned exceptions 
 
 33. Daniel J. Hemel & Aaron L. Nielson, Chevron Step One-and-a-Half, 84 
U. CHI. L. REV. 757 (2017) (describing the “Chevron Step One-and-a-Half ”  doc-
trine announced in Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1985)); see Peter Pan 
Bus Lines, Inc. v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 471 F.3d 1350, 1353–54 
(D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 34. W. Va. Highlands Conservancy, Inc. v. Norton, 343 F.3d 239, 245 (4th 
Cir. 2003) (quoting Burgin v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 120 F.3d 494, 497 (4th Cir. 
1997)). 
 35. See, e.g., Martin v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 903 F.3d 1154, 1161 (11th Cir. 
2018) (per curiam) (describing a circuit split over the issue). For more discussion 
on Chevron waiver, see James Durling & E. Garrett West, May Chevron Be 
Waived?, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 183 (2019); Jeremy Rozansky, Waiving Chev-
ron, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1927 (2008). 
 36. United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 566 U.S. 478, 494 
(2012) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 37. See id.; United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 245 (2001) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (assailing the majority’s application of Chevron as “confusing,” 
full of “utter flabbiness,” and “virtually open-ended”); id. at 257 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (criticizing the majority opinion for replacing the simplicity of Chev-
ron’s “across-the-board presumption” with “the indeterminacy of Skidmore def-
erence”); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to 
Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2602 (2006) (“[Mead] has produced a 
great deal of confusion and complexity, disappointing those who hoped that 
Chevron would simplify the law.”). 
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and caveats recognized that they were doing so at the cost of sim-
plicity and predictability.38 
The result of Chevron’s evolution is a doctrine that many 
now lament is so full of holes as to be troublesome in its applica-
tion.39 Some scholars question whether there remains much 
practical benefit in applying Chevron rather than a less deferen-
tial but more flexible and open-ended standard like Skidmore.40 
This same question is increasingly pertinent for courts 
charged with applying Auer. Exceptions and caveats—whether 
characterized as recent innovations or simply features of the 
original rule that were not expressly recognized until more re-
cently—have profoundly transformed Auer deference. What was 
formerly hailed as a simple, straightforward shortcut for quickly 
and predictably resolving potentially thorny cases is more and 
more a straitjacket that forces courts to resolve a different but 
equally thorny (or sometimes thornier) set of questions. 
Dueling Federal Circuit opinions in the Kisor case illustrate 
the point. The dispute underlying Kisor is whether the claimant, 
a veteran, is entitled to certain benefits for post-traumatic stress 
disorder. The Department of Veterans Affairs denied the claim-
ant’s request for those benefits. Its decision rested on the mean-
ing of the word “relevant” in a regulation governing the reopen-
ing of veterans’ claims. A panel of the Federal Circuit held that, 
as used in the regulation, “relevant” is ambiguous.41 Deferring 
under Auer, the panel gave the term the meaning given it by 
Board of Veterans Appeals, with the result that the claimant was 
denied the benefits he sought.42 
The Federal Circuit denied the claimant’s request for en 
banc rehearing, but three judges dissented from that decision.43 
They argued that “granting Auer deference to the [Department 
 
 38. See, e.g., Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 235–37 (majority opinion) (“Justice 
Scalia’s first priority over the years has been to limit and simplify. The Court’s 
choice has been to tailor deference to variety.”). 
 39. See In re Mersmann, 505 F.3d 1033, 1051 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Since Chev-
ron, the Court’s standard has evolved in many ways, leaving in its wake a con-
fusing path for courts to navigate.”); Cal. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Thompson, 321 
F.3d 835, 848 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Analyses by scholars and jurists alike have em-
phasized that [Mead and Barnhart] have further obscured the already murky 
administrative law surrounding Chevron.”). 
 40. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Without Deference, 81 MO. L. REV. 1075 
(2016). 
 41. Kisor v. Shulkin, 869 F.3d 1360, 1367–68 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 42. Id. at 1368. 
 43. Kisor v. Shulkin, 880 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (en banc order). 
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of Veterans Affairs’] interpretation of its own ambiguous regula-
tions flies in the face of . . . the longstanding canon that provi-
sions for benefits to members of the Armed Services are to be 
construed in the beneficiaries’ favor.”44 According to the dissent-
ers, there was no reason to apply Auer because applying the vet-
eran-friendly Armed Services canon should have resolved any 
doubts about the meaning of “relevant” in that case.45 
At the circuit level, then, Kisor boiled down to a disagree-
ment about the proper order in which to apply conflicting princi-
ples of interpretation (including deference doctrines). That hap-
pens to be an especially knotty area of the law, with courts and 
scholars having already staked out a range of conflicting posi-
tions.46 And, as noted above, such “order of operations” questions 
are just a few of the many that courts must now consider before 
applying Auer. 
The multifarious exceptions and qualifications courts have 
attached to Auer, and the disagreements and uncertainties they 
generate, invite the question: Does Auer still serve the practical 
purposes its defenders have touted it as serving? There is a good 
argument to be made that it does not. Whatever Auer ’s practical 
value was once understood to be, today’s legal landscape largely 
gives the lie to any claims that Auer appreciably simplifies 
things for courts, or that it improves consistency and predicta-
bility for regulated parties. 
Consider the glut of recent cases in which members of the 
same court are openly divided on the proper application of 
Auer.47 The opinions in those cases evince “widespread confusion 
 
 44. Id. at 1380 (quotation marks omitted). 
 45. See id. 
 46. See Note, Chevron and the Substantive Canons: A Categorical Distinc-
tion, 124 HARV. L. REV. 594, 600–01 (2010) (summarizing some of the ap-
proaches advocated by prominent scholars); Patricia G. Chapman, Has the 
Chevron Doctrine Run Out of Gas?, 19 MISS. C. L. REV. 115, 164 n.303 (1998) 
(same). Compare, e.g., United States v. Phifer, 909 F.3d 372, 384–85 (11th Cir. 
2018) (concluding that the rule of lenity supersedes Auer deference in criminal 
cases), and Maniilaq Ass’n v. Burwell, 170 F. Supp. 3d 243, 247–48 (D.D.C. 
2016) (citing California Valley Miwok Tribe v. United States, 515 F.3d 1262, 
1266 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2008), and holding that the pro-Indian canon trumps Auer 
deference), with Oppedisano v. Holder, 769 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding 
that Chevron deference supersedes the rule of lenity), and Haynes v. United 
States, 891 F.2d 235, 239 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that Chevron deference 
trumps the pro-Indian canon). 
 47. See, e.g., Kisor, 880 F.3d 1378; United States v. Havis, 907 F.3d 439 
(6th Cir. 2018); Marsh v. J. Alexander’s LLC, 905 F.3d 610 (9th Cir. 2018) (en 
banc); Turtle Island Restoration Network v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 878 F.3d 
725 (9th Cir. 2017); Real Alternatives, Inc. v. Sec’y Dep’t of Health & Human 
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[]  on many aspects of Auer deference, including its scope, ap-
plicability, and the relevant factors to be weighed when applying 
the doctrine.”48 Growing uncertainty about when and how to ap-
ply Auer is also consistent with data showing a downward trend 
in the percentage of cases in which courts invoke Auer to affirm 
an agency’s interpretation of a regulation.49 Perhaps the benefits 
of applying Auer just aren’t worth the trouble. 
The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Woudenberg v. Department of 
Agriculture50 illustrates this latter point. In considering the 
meaning of highly esoteric regulations promulgated by the De-
partment of Agriculture, the court undertook an exhaustive 
analysis that delved deep into the regulations’ text, structure, 
purpose, and history (going so far as to review individual com-
ments submitted prior to the agency’s amendment of the regula-
tions in question).51 Only after affirming the agency’s interpre-
tation on that basis did the court mention Auer deference, and 
then only in the final two sentences of the opinion.52 The 
Woudenberg court’s back-of-the-hand treatment of Auer—almost 
as an aside—bespeaks a reluctance to lean on the doctrine, even 
in cases where the doctrine seems to offer a straightforward an-
swer, and even when the alternative is several pages of pains-
taking analysis. 
To be sure, Auer ’s increasing complexity is not the only rea-
son courts might hesitate or disagree about how to apply it.53 But 
if some courts are so reluctant or uncertain in applying Auer def-
erence, that fact itself weighs against ascribing too much practi-
cal value to the standard because spotty application undermines 
the principles of consistency and predictability Auer is supposed 
to advance.54 
None of what we have written here is to argue unequivocally 
that Auer deference should be abandoned, whether in Kisor or 
 
Servs., 867 F.3d 338 (3d Cir. 2017); G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. 
Bd., 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016) (vacated sub nom 137 S. Ct. 1239). 
 48. Kevin O. Leske, Splits in the Rock: The Conflicting Interpretations of 
the Seminole Rock Deference Doctrine by the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 66 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 787, 787 (2014). 
 49. Barmore, supra note 9, at 815–16. 
 50. 794 F.3d 595 (6th Cir. 2015). 
 51. Id. at 597, 599–601. 
 52. Id. at 601. 
 53. Uncertainty about the doctrine’s future might be another factor 
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some future case. Nor do we assert that there are no longer any 
practical benefits to Auer.55 It seems inarguable to us, though, 
that most of the pragmatic reasons for retaining Auer have been 
substantially weakened by developments in the doctrine. If Auer 
survives Kisor, it should not be because Auer deference makes 
things significantly easier or more consistent and predictable for 
courts or regulated parties. It doesn’t. 
 
 
 55. For example, some scholars contend one of the “pragmatic arguments” 
for Auer is that it gives expert agencies (rather than inexpert judges) the pri-
mary role in applying often-technical regulations to complex changing circum-
stances. See Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 4, at 1460. That argument is 
largely unaffected by the growing list of exceptions and qualifications to Auer, 
except perhaps insofar as the exceptions and qualifications—by significantly re-
ducing the number of cases in which courts ultimately defer to agencies’ expert 
interpretations—diminish the agencies’ role. 
